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by **barry schwarz** on 13 Dec 2004, 00:08

This segment in the Defence Science Board's report matches exactly my own thoughts on the mishandling and misunderstanding of the war on terrorism. I submit it to you, Mate. It touches on a number points we've covered over the past year or so.

*

Chapter 2 – The New Strategic Environment

2.1 The Cold War Paradigm

In the second half of the 20th century U.S. national security was driven by the Cold War. America and its allies faced a seemingly powerful adversary—the Soviet Union — whose strategic objectives were inimical to our own. During this long struggle we used the various elements of national power—diplomatic, informational, military and economic—
to advance our interests. There is a conviction held by many that the “War on Terrorism” will have a similar influence in the 21st century. There are indeed similarities between the two struggles, and strategic communication will be as central to this war as it was to our Cold War strategy.

Throughout the Cold War the U.S. used a variety of informational and cultural means to weaken Marxist-Leninist regimes and keep alive the hope of freedom for tens of millions behind the “Iron Curtain.” Over the course of the Cold War era a suite of organizations — especially the Voice of America, the United States Information Agency, and a broad program of cultural and educational exchanges — spearheaded this effort. Several Presidential decision directives staked out the central role to be played by strategic communication.22 When Ronald Reagan stood in Berlin in June 1987 and demanded, “Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall”, he was speaking to a live television audience of millions behind that wall. East Germans had been watching Western TV for years, but Reagan turned this reality into a powerful metaphor that the wall’s days were numbered.

The Cold War transformed the entire U.S. national security structure, and created what has been called the “national security state.” The National Security Act of 1947, the web of military departments and intelligence agencies that it created, and the overriding doctrines of deterrence and containment, were integral to the Cold War. But above all the Cold War represented a conservative strategy that nurtured a conservative mindset: its strategy spoke of change, but its pervasive charge in contrast was to preserve. Despite seemingly black-and-white differences in governments and policies, over time we came to resemble our adversary, as our adversary came to resemble us. The U.S.S.R. generally acted like a normal nation state with which we could conduct diplomacy, conclude treaties, and engage in statecraft with a reasonably predictable leadership. By the 1960s the possibility of nuclear war declined as the terrible recognition of its apocalyptic consequences grew. In fact, both sides increasingly sought the assurance of stability to keep even the possibility of nuclear confrontation at arm’s length. But stability encouraged — even demanded — predictability, and thus the bureaucratic activities of both sides became highly routine. The Cold War evolved over time into a ritualized struggle that sought its own comfortable perpetuation. The very idea of “victory” slowly transformed from the idea of defeating Communism to the more perfect realization of “stability.”

Thus the Cold War’s end and outcome, with Russia in the 1990s reduced almost to a client state of the U.S., came as a shocking surprise. Our thorough inability to grasp the final dynamic changes that led to the end of the Cold War should be unsettling to us, but after all, the outcome was also a total victory. So the Cold War template was almost mythically anointed in the decade before 9/11. Thus, with the surprise announcement of a new struggle, the U.S. Government reflexively inclined toward Cold War-style responses to the new threat, without a thought or a care as to whether these were the best responses to a very different strategic situation.

The creation of the Department of Homeland Security and the passage of the Patriot Act were two such representative organizational and legislative responses. There will surely be many more the longer the struggle goes on — because deeper expectations within the Washington policy and defense cultures still seek out Cold War models. There is an expectation that, like the Cold War, the U.S. will naturally create enduring alliances and coalitions. Moreover, if the Cold War could be described as a struggle against one form of totalitarianism — Marxist-Leninism — so too there is a desire to describe the “War on Terrorism” as a struggle against yet another form of totalitarianism — this time in the form of a radical Islamist vision. Thus the problem is presented as one of how to confront and eventually defeat another totalitarian evil. And as with the Cold War, many now also declare that it is incumbent on the U.S. to assume leadership in this struggle.

But this is no Cold War. We call it a war on terrorism ― but Muslims in contrast see a history-shaking movement of Islamic restoration. This is not simply a religious revival, however, but also a renewal of the Muslim World itself. And it has taken form through many variant movements, both moderate and militant, with many millions of adherents ― of which radical fighters are only a small part. Moreover, these movements for restoration also represent, in their variant visions, the reality of multiple identities within Islam.

If there is one overarching goal they share, it is the overthrow of what Islamists call the “apostate” regimes: the tyrannies of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Jordan, and the Gulf states. They are the main target of the broader Islamist movement, as well as the actual fighter groups. The United States finds itself in the strategically awkward — and potentially dangerous — situation of being the longstanding prop and alliance partner of these authoritarian regimes. Without the U.S. these regimes could not survive. Thus the U.S. has strongly taken sides in a desperate struggle that is both broadly cast for all Muslims and country-specific.

This is the larger strategic context, and it is acutely uncomfortable: U.S. policies and actions are increasingly seen by the overwhelming majority of Muslims as a threat to the survival of Islam itself. Three recent polls of Muslims show an overwhelming conviction that the U.S. seeks to “dominate” and “weaken” the Muslim World.24 Not only is every
American initiative and commitment in the Muslim World enmeshed in the larger dynamic of intra-Islamic hostilities — but Americans have inserted themselves into this intra-Islamic struggle in ways that have made us an enemy to most Muslims.

Therefore, in stark contrast to the Cold War, the United States today is not seeking to contain a threatening state/empire, but rather seeking to convert a broad movement within Islamic civilization to accept the value structure of Western Modernity — an agenda hidden within the official rubric of a “War on Terrorism.”

But if the strategic situation is wholly unlike the Cold War, our response nonetheless has tended to imitate the routines and bureaucratic responses and mindset that so characterized that era. In terms of strategic communication especially, the Cold War emphasized:

• Dissemination of information to “huddled masses yearning to be free.” Today we reflexively compare Muslim “masses” to those oppressed under Soviet rule. This is a strategic mistake. There is no yearning-to-be-liberated-by-the-U.S. groundswell among Muslim societies — except to be liberated perhaps from what they see as apostate tyrannies that the U.S. so determinedly promotes and defends.

• An enduringly stable propaganda environment. The Cold War was a status quo setting that emphasized routine message-packaging — and whose essential objective was the most efficient enactment of the routine. In contrast the situation in Islam today is highly dynamic, and likely to move decisively in one direction or another. The U.S. urgently needs to think in terms of promoting actual positive change.

• An acceptance of authoritarian regimes as long as they were anti-communist. This could be glossed over in our message of freedom and democracy because it was the main adversary only that truly mattered. Today, however, the perception of intimate U.S. support of tyrannies in the Muslim World is perhaps the critical vulnerability in American strategy. It strongly undercuts our message, while strongly promoting that of the enemy.

by **mate** on 14 Dec 2004, 14:35

One, I don't think at all that the preceding report matches exactly your reasoning concerning the war on terror. Whereas the above snippet acknowledges a fairly serious Islamic threat, no matter how the agents of the threat view the current state of affairs, you seem to dismiss the danger posed by growing radicalism of the Islamic world.

U.S. policies and actions are increasingly seen by the overwhelming majority of Muslims as a threat to the survival of Islam itself. Three recent polls of Muslims show an overwhelming conviction that the U.S. seeks to “dominate” and “weaken” the Muslim World.24 Not only is every American initiative and commitment in the Muslim World enmeshed in the larger dynamic of intra-Islamic hostilities — but Americans have inserted themselves into this intra-Islamic struggle in ways that have made us an enemy to most Muslims.

Increasingly? This view has long been harbored, something that culminated in 9-11. At the very least, acknowledge the reality of the threat.

Two, your citation itself presents some fallacies. Consider:

An acceptance of authoritarian regimes as long as they were anti-communist. This could be glossed over in our message of freedom and democracy because it was the main adversary only that truly mattered. Today, however, the perception of intimate U.S. support of tyrannies in the Muslim World is perhaps the critical vulnerability in American strategy. It strongly undercuts our message, while strongly promoting that of the enemy.

Well, this sounds nice but is smashed, pardon the pun, by the fact that we dismantled a wholly totalitarian Iraqi regime and are fighting to establish a democracy in its place that actually serves the people of Iraq. But, I guess this only sends another undercutting message, eh?

Sorry Barry, but there is and will be a threat for some time. The Islamic world is already consumed with such a polarized view of the US that all our actions will be seen as malevolent. Consider, one among many, such an expression of polarization.

http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/asiapcf/s ... ia.oic.ap/

"We are gathered here at a time characterized by great challenges confronting the Muslim Ummah (community)," Malaysian Foreign Minister Syed Hamid Albar said.

"The threats of unilateralism, globalization and terrorism, the precarious situation in the Middle East and the uncertain future of Iraq ... have only served to threaten our very survival."

Now, consider this assessment by the former head of the CIA:

http://www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/s ... 62002.html

The terrorist threat goes well beyond al-Qa’ida. The situation in the Middle East continues to fuel terrorism and anti-US sentiment worldwide. Groups like the Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and HAMAS have escalated their violence against Israel, and the intifada has rejuvenated once-dormant groups like the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. If these groups feel that US actions are threatening their existence, they may begin targeting Americans directly—as Hizballah’s terrorist wing already does.

This was issued in 2002, before the invasion of Iraq. The conditions that fuel and continue to fuel Islamic radicalism long existed. The invasion of Iraq is part and parcel of a comprehensive strategy to engage and mitigate this threat. Despite this justifiable security imperative, the Islamists, quite understandably, lament that this is yet another imperial overture against Islam.

It is basic causality Barry. In essence, they hated and already were polarized against us. They struck in a devestating way. We're striking back. All things being equal, I am supporting our democratically elected leadership and our experienced strategists in these endeavors. I acknowledge the mistakes and criticize accordingly, but not to the point of undermining the cause and distorting its justice.

But please...do indeed go on and on about the US making strategic mistakes and pursuing imperialism and falling into authoritarianism. Contest every and all American decisions, offering your own considerable strategic experience.

I don't want to be sarcastic, but you increasingly leave me no other option. I can square with your criticizing exaggerations by the Bush administration on specific intelligence...namely the Al-Qaeda/Saddam link...but you too often shift and adapt your position to paint as malevolent a picture of US intent as you can without seeming too unreasonable...refusing to acknowledge basic, objective starting points that set an objective frame of reference.

Unfortunately, you decided apriori that the Bush administration has malicious intentions in Iraq, that the invasion has nothing to do with the war on terror, that the whole endeavor was a conspiracy facilitated...not given imperative...by 9-11.

We just don't see eye to eye on this.

Cheers, Mate

by **mate** on 14 Dec 2004, 14:46

This is an excellent article written before 9-11. It discusses the use of military force, from a non-partisan purely military perspective, in combatting terrorism.

Pay attention about the relationship between states and terrorists and holding the former accountable for the actions of the latter.

http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/Review/20 ... t1-sp0.htm

Still, it is critical to recognize that if the United States intends to use military force to modify the behavior of a terrorist group or a state sponsoring it, the group or state must have something to lose. It is in part for this reason that the ability of military force to modify the behavior of a terrorist group, with little targetable infrastructure, is transitory; military force cannot stop terrorism. In contrast, states do have something to lose from military retaliation; not surprisingly, the case studies provide evidence that military force can strike directly at the state sponsorship of terrorism. Without such sponsorship, terrorist groups become less effective.

In each of the three cases, military force against terrorism was either the last resort or the only useful choice. But when employed in the proper context, with due precautions and limitations, and under the right conditions, military force can limit the influence of the terrorist. Military force can demonstrate U.S. resolve to punish those who engage in terrorism; it can keep the terrorist isolated and on the defensive; it can support antiterrorism action in other areas; and it can pressure states from sponsoring terrorism. It can do all this without making the violence worse than it was before. The use of military force can contribute to the containment of terrorism and support U.S. national interests. It is not without risk, and it is not appropriate for every terrorist threat, but given the right situation and the proper conditions, military force can provide a powerful option. The war on terrorism continues, and the United States will need every resource and option it has. 

Cheers, Mate

by **barry schwarz** on 16 Dec 2004, 10:26

One, I don't think at all that the preceding report matches exactly your reasoning concerning the war on terror.

One point five, I don’t think it does either. Why do you make up false arguments? I simply said the item corresponds with some of what has been posited by myself and others.

To whit;

The United States finds itself in the strategically awkward — and potentially dangerous — situation of being the longstanding prop and alliance partner of these authoritarian regimes. Without the U.S. these regimes could not survive.

[…]

This is the larger strategic context, and it is acutely uncomfortable: U.S. policies and actions are increasingly seen by the overwhelming majority of Muslims as a threat to the survival of Islam itself.

(similar to my point on trying to change a culture)

Americans have inserted themselves into this intra-Islamic struggle in ways that have made us an enemy to most Muslims.

[…]

…the United States today is not seeking to contain a threatening state/empire, but rather seeking to convert a broad movement within Islamic civilization to accept the value structure of Western Modernity — an agenda hidden within the official rubric of a “War on Terrorism."

(ditto)

Today we reflexively compare Muslim “masses” to those oppressed under Soviet rule. This is a strategic mistake. There is no yearning-to-be-liberated-by-the-U.S. groundswell among Muslim societies

[…]

Today, however, the perception of intimate U.S. support of tyrannies in the Muslim World is perhaps the critical vulnerability in American strategy. It strongly undercuts our message, while strongly promoting that of the enemy.

Surely this sounds familiar.

The entire document is dedicated to examining US image projection and how to make it more efficient. The authors recognize that the ‘packaging’ of US initiative isn’t working. A clear implication is that the war on Iraq was a public relations backslide.

Whereas the above snippet acknowledges a fairly serious Islamic threat…

You wish.

This is not simply a religious revival, however, but also a renewal of the Muslim World itself. And it has taken form through many variant movements, both moderate and militant, with many millions of adherents - of which radical fighters are only a small part.

Which part of the snippet were you referring to, exactly?

…no matter how the agents of the threat view the current state of affairs, you seem to dismiss the danger posed by growing radicalism of the Islamic world.

Unfortunately you have taken to caricaturing my position. You are becoming dismissive yourself, and increasingly condescending. A shame.

I do consider international terrorism emanating from the ME a ‘threat’, but where we differ is on the magnitude of the threat. The snipper above tends to favour my take. Your prognostications on the matter put WMD and terrorists together. While this is a concern, it is strategically weak in my opinion, to wage preventative wars on the ME to obviate a projected notion. Iraq was a huge mistake in this instance – the projection was without foundation in fact. This is something you dismiss as a ‘mistake’. Far too casual, Mate. Take the rose (blanc et bleu) coloured lenses out.

The ME is in political turmoil. The dynamic is dangerous. The rest of the world needs to keep the powder keg at arms length and away from matches. The uber-plan for the ME is bound to throw burning brands on the keg, and the explosion will not be able to be contaioned.

Today, however, the perception of intimate U.S. support of tyrannies in the Muslim World is perhaps the critical vulnerability in American strategy. It strongly undercuts our message, while strongly promoting that of the enemy.

Well, this sounds nice but is smashed, pardon the pun, by the fact that we dismantled a wholly totalitarian Iraqi regime and are fighting to establish a democracy in its place that actually serves the people of Iraq. But, I guess this only sends another undercutting message, eh?

It has become apparent to me that you are unable to see much beyond your partisan approval of the US. It is enough for you that the US ‘means well’. You completely missed the keyword in the portion you cited that makes a fallacy of your editorial. ‘PERCEPTION”. You just don’t understand how Middle Easterners could so misunderstand the benevolence of the US. They shouldn’t pay attention to the bombs dropped, but the word freedom painted on the side.

The report proper contends that the US is widely seen as arrogant, belligerent, self-serving. All well and good that you concede mistakes – these are absolutely critical to Middle Easterners (nopticed with less difficulty than you appear to have by many here and elsewhere in the world. It is sheer arrogance to expect that Middle Easterners should look favourably on wars against ME countries. They simply don’t buy the agenda. Don’t you get that? Or, if you do, is that just too bad then?

Arrogance and belligerence. It’s your way or the highway. I welcome your exhortations to diplomacy etc, but cannot understand your blind optimism regarding the war option. Iraq, in this regard, was a massive failure in the battle for hearts and minds, and even elections won’t change that. The snippet above, and the entire document is all about the battle for hearts and minds – something I always said was key, by the way. You don’t seem to get this, or appear to think it will be of no consequence in the (very) long run.

The Islamic world is already consumed with such a polarized view of the US that all our actions will be seen as malevolent. Consider, one among many, such an expression of polarization.

Well, maybe you do ‘get it’, but you appear to give it little consequence. This failure to acknowledge such a strategic failure is reflected by the Bush administration (who have yet to comment on the report).

It is basic causality Barry. In essence, they hated and already were polarized against us. They struck in a devestating way. We're striking back.

Supposedly they just decided, “Yeah, the US is just a bad country. Let’s attack” in some kind of vacuum. For you, causality only applies to the ‘enemy’, not to any US (or British, French etc) intervention in the region. Pathetic. Your partisanship is as pure as the driven snow.

I am supporting our democratically elected leadership and our experienced strategists in these endeavors.

Yes yes yes yes yes. Can we move on?

I acknowledge the mistakes and criticize accordingly, but not to the point of undermining the cause and distorting its justice.

There is no justice in the cause. Some of the mistakes you acknowledge are a reflection of that.

…you too often shift and adapt your position to paint as malevolent a picture of US intent as you can without seeming too unreasonable...

Bullshit. I have theorized on what may have prompted war on Iraq. My feeling, and I don’t have enough hard data to make a more concrete analysis, is that a variety of agendas prompted intervention, most of them in the name of national self-interest. You remember Wolfowitz’s famous quote that WMD was the rationale settled on for bureaucratic reasons? “It was something we could al agree on”.

refusing to acknowledge basic, objective starting points that set an objective frame of reference.

Objective things like the US is a permanently benevolent international actor? Is it unobjective of me to trust less the ‘experienced strategists’ you place your faith in?

The truth is, it is you who have been unobjective. You simply trust that the US is well-intentioned and wise enough to do the right thing. While you endeavour to rationalize this position by arguing about ‘checks and balances’, and occasionally referencing past US triumphs, ultimately it is a faith-based position that cannot be dented by serious errors. And you only go so far as to acknowledge that the US acts self-interestedly when it also benefits other nations. This is tripe, and it is inconceivable that a person of your experience should be so naïve.

Unfortunately, you decided apriori that the Bush administration has malicious intentions in Iraq

Caricaturing my POV is becoming boring. Mate. You are running out of arguments as the failure continues and grows, and now resort to cheerleading and demonisation of my contribution to this discussion. Loosen your grip – you’re becoming shriller by the post.

Before the war, I saw no evidence that Iraq was a threat, and I fell to speculating on what other agendas may be driving the effort. Not ‘malicious intentions’ – I don’t think the Bush administration gets off on killing Iraqis (Arabs or Muslims or whatever), but national self-interest, rationalised by an ideology that paints the US as the greatest force for good in history, a moral paragon. What’s good for the US is good for the world.

that the invasion has nothing to do with the war on terror, that the whole endeavor was a conspiracy facilitated...not given imperative...by 9-11.

I believe Iraq was on the radar well before 9/11. I hold that it is possible war on Iraq is part of a grand plan for modernising the ME, but I hold more certain that this putsch is immoral (the ends are not justified by the means) and too perilous anyway. It is simply not worth the death destruction, and risk that it will fail. Were I to utterly believe (and I don’t necessarily disbelieve), I would be forced to deem the US government and strategic experts (many of whom considered war on Iraq a strategic error – there have been two reports recently out of the US strategic science departments that describe the democratisation of the ME by force as a reckless and probably doomed project) to be incompetent. It is because I give these experts more credence that I speculate on other agendas. The pre-9/11 desire for war on Iraq by many in the key positions in the US administration (and attendees of influence) is not conspiracy theory, but a statement of public fact. Something you also appear to dismiss. I don’t know why you discard reams of material supporting this open wish from Rumsfeld, Cheney, Wolfowitz, Feith, Perle, Bolton, Armitage etc etc.

As for your second post, it is irrelevant cheerleading. The snippet may have some force in regards to Afghanistan, but the prudence it encourages does not apply to the war against Iraq, nor to a region-wide enforcement of democracy.

by **Felix K** on 16 Dec 2004, 13:05

In the absence of a "Human rights" thread, I think this one best fits the "War on terror" category:

Terror detainees win Lords appeal

In a blow to the government's anti-terror measures, the House of Lords ruled by an eight to one majority in favour of appeals by nine detainees. The Law Lords said the measures were incompatible with European human rights laws, but Home Secretary Charles Clarke said the men would remain in prison. He said the measures would "remain in force" until the law was reviewed. Most of the men are being held indefinitely in Belmarsh prison, south London.

The ruling creates a major problem for Mr Clarke on his first day as home secretary following David Blunkett's resignation. In a statement to MPs, Mr Clarke said: "I will be asking Parliament to renew this legislation in the New Year. "In the meantime, we will be studying the judgment carefully to see whether it is possible to modify our legislation to address the concerns raised by the House of Lords."

Solicitor Gareth Peirce, who represents eight of the detainees, said: "The government has to take steps to withdraw the legislation and release the detainees." If there was no swift government action, the detainees could ask the European Court of Human Rights to get involved, she added.

More: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4100481.stm

by **barry schwarz** on 17 Dec 2004, 21:17

I sould correct my first sentence on this thread.

This segment in the Defence Science Board's report matches exactly my own thoughts on the mishandling and misunderstanding of the war on terrorism.

The snippet includes points I haven't considered, but where it touches on points I've made in the past, it coincides with my own thinking;

It touches on a number points we've covered over the past year or so.

Mate wrote;

Increasingly? This view has long been harbored...

You imply a contradiction that isn't there.

But please...do indeed go on and on about the US making strategic mistakes and pursuing imperialism and falling into authoritarianism. Contest every and all American decisions, offering your own considerable strategic experience.

More caricature. You've obviously missed where I've said I don't believe the US is currently guilty of being an imperial actor - you can find just that in the first post on the other thread under this topic. I have also put it that the Bush administration has leaned towards authoritarian practise, not that the US has 'fallen into' it. And once again, you resort to impugning my ability to consider the matters we are discussing. I may not be a soldier, Mate, but politics, of which militancy is an instrument, is everyone's province - or should we just leave such weighty considerations to the 'elite' (such as yourself ?)?

by **barry schwarz** on 17 Dec 2004, 23:47

I noticed some interesting points in the report you cited, Mate.

(Libya)

In summary, ELDORADO CANYON stands as a significant event in the U.S. war against terrorism. For the first time, U.S. military force was employed in direct retaliation to state-sponsored terrorism. Despite the only moderate military effectiveness of the attack, the accompanying severe collateral damage, and the initial condemnation by European allies, the Air Force and Navy bombing challenged Qaddafi’s standing as an international terrorist, exposed and exacerbated his domestic weakness and international isolation, and left him less willing to encourage international terrorism openly. Most significantly, it did all this without producing a new cycle of terrorism against Americans, thereby dispelling a myth widely held in the West disparaging the value of military force against terrorism.

(Iraq - 1993)

The Iraqi case is somewhat problematic, because although the U.S. military action was specifically a response to a terrorist threat, it is more properly viewed as part of the larger confrontation between the United States and Iraq, unrelated to terrorism;

[...]

However, the strike cannot be said to have had much impact with respect to international terrorism, for Iraq had not been perceived as an international terrorist threat. The strike did not stimulate an Iraqi reprisal, but there had never been active Iraqi terrorism against Americans.

(Afghanistan/Sudan)

It is not possible, so soon after the event, to assess the long-term effects of the August 1998 strikes on Osama bin Laden’s terrorism. Nevertheless, the U.S. strikes do appear to have put bin Laden’s terrorist organization on the defensive. Instead of focusing resources and attention on planning or executing new attacks, the group must have had to step back and regroup. The United States had threatened it in a new and substantial way. The strikes may not have ended bin Laden’s terrorist operations, but they appear to have limited his ability to carry out whatever attacks were being planned to follow the embassy bombings.

[...]

The new collaboration has kept bin Laden’s group on the run.

As you pointed out, Mate, this was written before 9/11.

by **barry schwarz** on 21 Dec 2004, 23:12

Mate, isn't the very fact of an open and various hullaballoo from the West regarding the war in Iraq etc a wonderful expression of liberty? Don't you think some or many of those we wish to liberate are inspired by a deeply passionate response to it all from 'us', without a shot fired in anger?

You see it too narrowly, too militaristically. You think our cousins are better served by the West being all of one mind. We flog individualism, personal libery, tolerance, diversity, freedom of choice, of belief, of opinion, of plurality - isn't it better in mind to be that which we exault?

For our cousins that mistrust, dislike or hate us, mightn't comment from the West in accord with their thinking indicate some strength in the Western democratic model? Might they then pause to think that the West is not some monolithic enemy, but a free/r society of individuals? And might that not mitigate violence against civilans?

Some naifs like to moan about Iraqi military tactics taking the fight to the people, into cities instead of trading shells in the desert. They wanted the army to stand alone from the people, out of harms way. You would have the people join the army. I am glad we in the West are multi-minded. Western civilization is not served by everyone marching in-step. See it as a cultural strategy, if you like. Otherwise, why not celebrate this exemplar of Western idealism? Maybe it gives comfort to democratic aspirants around the world.

by **mate** on 28 Dec 2004, 15:19

I promise I will more fully and consistently continue this discussion right after the new year. I have been consumed by work and holiday social obligations lately.

Hope you all here have a safe and happy holidays. I share everybody's wishes for a better world in 2005...if not exactly the way to go about achieving this.

Cheers, Mate

by **Eugene Berkovich** on 29 Dec 2004, 14:58

Did anyone catch the Rumsfeld foot-in-the-mouth incident?

For those who did not, in his speech he had seemed to misspeak by saying that Flight 93 was shot down, rather than brought down during the passenger struggle with the terrorists.

I think he did not misspeak. Could it be the curious way the truth is trying to come out?

by **dezzi** on 29 Dec 2004, 19:10

Eug'

I've been all over that Rummy story....I can't belive he said that.....part of me thinks he mis-spoke, then part of me thinks - with his resignation being more and more furiously called for - that he intentionally "mis-spoke" to let the powers that be know that he won't go quietly....kind of like:

"if I go down - we're all going down."

Of course, if we did shoot Flight 93 down (and there are witnesses to the crash site that have testified to seeing a military jet in the area - as well as a debri field spanning over 8 miles) that makes the whole "Todd Beamer-Let's Roll" story more BS from this whole "official version of events".....it's a joke....everyone knows it - I just think that it's too ugly to acept:

Our government has dirty hands in 9/11.

Rummy didn't mis-speak. He's a Capital Hill Veteran, and the things those guys say are too calculated and scrutinized. He spoke the truth. Flight 93 was shot down.

by **barry schwarz** on 03 Jan 2005, 11:10

Aye, I caught that slip too, courtesy of a post by Bela. If there's fire making that smoke, Rummy just added fuel to it.

by **mate** on 06 Jan 2005, 17:16

Guys...

Damn but I remain tied up at work in the early part of this year.

However, I see none of you have lost a step in running towards that conspiratorial finishing line. Talk about make a prophesy self-fulfilling!

:P

Cheers, Mate

by **Eugene Berkovich** on 07 Jan 2005, 16:02

SO, Mate... It was no more than a misspeak then?

by **mate** on 07 Jan 2005, 17:16

b Eugene...

Maybe it was, maybe it wasn't.

However, I would bet the odds favor the former. Besides, weren't there private cell phone calls made by passengers communicating to loved ones that they were going to challenge the hijackers violently?

Sorry, but there simply isn't any credible evidence of a shoot down...and let's not even get started about how many people would have to hush up about it, from the USAF pilots, radar controllers, air defense manners, follow on personnel, etc. It would be some conspiracy indeed.

by **Eugene Berkovich** on 10 Jan 2005, 11:31

mate wrote:b Eugene...

Maybe it was, maybe it wasn't.

However, I would bet the odds favor the former. Besides, weren't there private cell phone calls made by passengers communicating to loved ones that they were going to challenge the hijackers violently?

How does that preclude the shooting down? I am sure the passengers did violently challenge the hijackers. So?

Sorry, but there simply isn't any credible evidence of a shoot down...and let's not even get started about how many people would have to hush up about it, from the USAF pilots, radar controllers, air defense manners, follow on personnel, etc. It would be some conspiracy indeed.

Well, actually, some are not being quiet about it. Some pilots and air controllers have, indeed, spoken and suggested that the plane was shot down. Hell, even Rumsfeld, now, has.

But, you're right. This theory lacks proof.

by **mate** on 11 Jan 2005, 13:42

Eugene

Hell, at least you explicitly acknowledge it to be no more than a theory, if you can even call it that. Remember, a theory is something a bit more than a hypothesis.

The overall tone here might have led an observer to conclude that this was something more than even a theory. Then again, the Village Voice has its own definitions of such.

by **barry schwarz** on 11 Jan 2005, 21:58

dezzi seems convinced the plane was shot down. Eugene and I are not so sure. Three minds, one certain, another swayed towards conspiracy but not convinced, and an objective comment. Yet you mention an 'overall tone' affirming conspiracy theory. Who, exactly, are you referring to?

by **Leonid** on 12 Jan 2005, 20:43

http://www.commentarymagazine.com/speci ... 025_1.html

by **Eugene Berkovich** on 13 Jan 2005, 15:13

Which is why Norman Podhoretz writes for the God-forsaken commentarymagazine.com ...

by **barry schwarz** on 15 Jan 2005, 01:45

Podhoretz makes a half decent attempted not to appear partisan.

But;

In common with almost every pundit and every inhabitant of every foreign ministry on the face of the earth, Luttwak fails to recognize the exceptionally strong leader America has found in this President, or to take the measure of his boldness, his determination, and his stamina. The poll-driven Bill Clinton may have reverted to "the moderate mean," but Bush, although an immensely skillful politician, is not nearly so poll-driven.

[...]

For openers, having dismayed his more hawkish supporters (myself included) by pulling back from Falluja in April, he now ordered a full-fledged assault on that terrorist stronghold. He also gave the go-ahead to similar operations against other pockets of the insurgency struggling to drive us out of Iraq and to prevent any further progress in the process of democratization.

"us".

At the same time, Bush moved with comparable forcefulness against the insurgency within his own administration. First he sent Porter Goss to the CIA with a mandate to clean out the officials there who (apart from providing faulty intelligence) had been hell-bent on sabotaging the Bush Doctrine. And then he turned his attention to the State Department. Under Colin Powell, it, too, had been actively undermining the President’s policy to the point where it came to be described by those in a position to know as the "most insubordinate" State Department in American history.

Forsooth, the quest of these heretics was to sabotage the administration, not to question assumptions now shown to be incorrect.

In replacing Powell with Condoleezza Rice, Bush was putting Foggy Bottom on notice that such activities would no longer be tolerated. As his National Security Adviser throughout the first term, Rice was a fierce loyalist, and she can now be counted upon to push the State Department bureaucracy into supporting the policies of the President it is supposed to serve instead of setting its face against them.

Alternative views cannot be countenanced - this is a time for unflinching patriotism and unwavering loyalty to the President - and his policies. The US administration needs to think like soldiers, not like democrats.

But of all the groups making up the coalition against the Bush Doctrine, the one with the most to lose is the realists.

"Most to lose"? What - reputation? This abstracted contest of political theorists is a waste of commentary.

When Bush charged Saddam Hussein with refusing to give up his weapons of mass destruction, he was relying in good faith on what the CIA—and every other intelligence agency in the world—assured him was the case. He was also acting in good faith when he warned that Saddam might put such weapons into the hands of terrorists, and when he then invoked this danger in an advance justification of the new policy of preemption ("If we wait for threats to fully materialize, we will have waited too long").

A striking bit of propaganda. From what understanding came the 'good faith' that "Saddam might put such weapons into the hands of terrorists"? Podhoretz troubles to (myopically) justify Bush's take on WMD, but he has no source at all for the follow on argument - save the Bush administration itself.

He writes;

Nothing will be heard from these quarters about the progress being made in getting a free political system going, in reconstructing the economy, and in establishing law and order throughout most of the country, even as the more aggressive measures being taken against the insurgency are having an effect within the Sunni triangle.

"Having an effect?" Why doesn't he substantiate? Because a quarter of the constutuency is unlikely to vote, and this interferes with his advocacy. Step over the next sentence;

As I write these words, about a month before elections are scheduled to be held in Iraq, the insurgency is stepping up its murderous campaign to frighten people away from the polls and to force a postponement.

"Having an effect", and, "the insurgency is stepping up its murderous campaign". These contradictions are mitigated only by ambiguity. Reason gives way to rhetoric.

My guess is that these terrorist attacks (which took the lives of more than 60 Iraqi civilians on a single day in December) will not succeed, and that even if they do, the postponement will not be indefinite and elections will take place sooner rather than later.

What shattering insight. I thought Podhoretz was a serious writer?

Which is why I think (to say it one last time) that the amazing leader this President has amazingly turned out to be will—like the comparably amazing Harry Truman before him when he took on the Communist world—have the wind at his back as he continues the struggle against Islamist radicalism and its vicious terrorist armory: a struggle whose objective is the spread of liberty and whose success will bring greater security and greater prosperity not only to the people of this country, and not only to the people of the greater Middle East, but also to the people of Europe and beyond, in spite of the sorry fact that so many of them do not wish to know it yet.

Amazing.

*

Leonid;

If democratization is to succeed in the regimes of the Islamic world, a necessary precondition is to beat these regimes into "complete submission" and then occupy them

[...]

I have no objection in principle to the ruthlessness the superhawks advocate, and I agree that it would likely be very effective. The trouble is that the more closely I look at their position, the more clearly does it emerge as fatally infected by the disease of utopianism—the very disease that usually fills critics of this stripe with revulsion and fear.

When these critics prescribe all-out war—total mobilization at home, total ruthlessness on the battlefield—they posit a world that does not exist, at least not in America or in any other democratic country. To the extent that they bother taking account of the America that actually does exist, it is only its imperfections and deficiencies they notice; and these, along with the constraints imposed by the character of the nation on its elected leaders, they wave off with derisive language, as when Codevilla refers sarcastically to "the lowest common denominator among domestic American political forces."

Yet while Codevilla, writing in his study, is free to advise ruthless suppression of these limiting conditions, no one sitting in the Oval Office can possibly do so. And even so, the wonder is not, contrary to Mark Helprin, how "irresolute" and "inept" Bush has been but how far he has managed to go and how much he has already accomplished while working within those constraints and around those imperfections.

Leonid, what Podohertz rebutts here is not a far cry from your own musings on the general thread. What do you say to it?

by **barry schwarz** on 27 Jan 2005, 20:39

This article is a statistical analysis of misperceptions regarding the Iraq war based on a range of persuasions, and how these misperceptions rank to media source.

It is entirely objective. There is no comment, just a breakdown of stats.

http://pipa.org/OnlineReports/Iraq/Medi ... Report.pdf

I will draw the rather obvious conclusions. The highest number of egregious misperceptions come from Fox viewers, the lowest from PBS viewers and NPR listeners and print media (The highest number of respondants that obtained their news from a primary source are Fox viewers - 18%; the lowest - 3% - are PBS/NPR followers).

Among four popular misconceptions (WMD found in Iraq, collaboration between al Qaida and Hussein, Iraq linked to 9/11, misperceptions of world opinion), a minority erred on each, but the tally for those who held one or more misperceptions across the board was a clear majority. Support for the war increases with each misperception. Basically, the clear majority of those who hold/held none of the misperceptions disapprove/d of the war in Iraq.

It was found the more closely one followed Fox, the greater the level of misperception.

These figures remain fairly consistent even after the Bush administration publicly concedes on each issue. Therefore, not only did the news networks let the public down (by not fully presenting dissenting views), erroneous views became so entrenched that they continue to be held even after the Bush administration - source of the original misperceptions - eventually repudiated them.

(I've copied this to the Iraq thread - relevant there, too)

by **barry schwarz** on 02 May 2005, 06:11

Seven months before Sept. 11, 2001, the State Department issued a human rights report on Uzbekistan. It was a litany of horrors.

The police repeatedly tortured prisoners, State Department officials wrote, noting that the most common techniques were "beating, often with blunt weapons, and asphyxiation with a gas mask." Separately, international human rights groups had reported that torture in Uzbek jails included boiling of body parts, using electroshock on genitals and plucking off fingernails and toenails with pliers. Two prisoners were boiled to death, the groups reported. The February 2001 State Department report stated bluntly, "Uzbekistan is an authoritarian state with limited civil rights."

Immediately after the Sept. 11 attacks, however, the Bush administration turned to Uzbekistan as a partner in fighting global terrorism.

http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/01/inter ... &th&emc=th[/quote]

by **Leonid** on 16 May 2005, 11:43

National Review

Deadly Mistake
Newsweek’s erroneous report and apology demonstrates journalistic cluelessness.

By Paul Marshall

The shakily sourced May 9 Newsweek report that interrogators had desecrated a Koran at Guantanamo Bay is likely to do more damage to the U.S. than the Abu Ghraib prison scandals. What is also deeply disturbing is that the journalists who put the report out seem somewhat clueless about this reality.

Since the story was published there has been outrage and mayhem in much of the Muslim world. Demonstrations erupted in Pakistan after Imran Khan, a former cricket player and now opposition political figure, read sections from the article at a press conference.

Riots broke out throughout Afghanistan, mobs attacked government and aid-organization offices, and 15 people have died so far. Anti-American demonstrations have taken took place from north Africa to Indonesia.

Sheikh Sayed Tantawi, the head of Al-Azhar in Cairo, the major center of Sunni learning, called the purported desecration “a great crime,” while Egypt’s mufti, Sheikh Ali Gomaa, called it “an unforgivable crime” and “aggression” on Islam’s “sacred values.” The Gulf Cooperation Council, a set of American allies, called for the “harshest punishment” so that “the dignity of Muslims” could be preserved. Officials in Gaza and Iran also waded in.

This weekend, Abdul Fatah Fayeq, the senior judicial figure in Afghanistan’s Badakhshan Province, read out a statement from 300 Muslim clerics stating that President Bush should hand the culprits over to an Islamic country for punishment or else “we will launch a jihad against America.”

Meanwhile, in the face of Pentagon denials, Newsweek has begun backtracking. Newsweek seemed to have had doubts about the report from the beginning, since they ran it not as a straight news story but as a squiblet in the “Periscope” section. Now, in the May 23 issue, editor Mark Whitaker admits that their sourcing was suspect and stated “we regret that we got any part of our story wrong, and extend our sympathies to victims of the violence and to the U.S. soldiers caught in its midst.” In the same issue, Assistant Managing Editor Evan Thomas is more forthright, asking “How did NEWSWEEK get its facts wrong?”

Equally disturbing is the fact that Newsweek reporters seemed to have little idea how explosive such a story would be. While noting that, to Muslims, desecrating the Koran “is especially heinous,” Thomas looks for explanations, including “extremist agitators,” of why protest and rioting spread throughout the world, and maintains that it was at Imram Khan’s press conference that “the spark was apparently lit.” He confesses that after “so many gruesome reports of torture and abuse at Abu Ghraib and elsewhere, the vehemence of feeling around this case came as something of a surprise.”

What planet do these people live on that they are surprised by something so entirely predictable? Anybody with a little knowledge could have told them it was likely that people would die as a result of the article. Remember Salman Rushdie?

The spark was lit not by Imram Khan but by Newsweek itself on May 9 when apparently none of its reporters or editors was aware of the effect such a story would have. There seems to have been nobody there that knew that death is the penalty for desecrating a Koran in Saudi Arabia, Iran, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. Egypt is milder, there one would be sentenced to several years in prison under Article 161 of the penal code for “publicly insulting Islam,” or perhaps Article 98, “inciting sectarian strife”; similar patterns are followed in more moderate Muslim countries.

In Pakistan, Article 295-B of the penal code calls for life imprisonment for desecrating the Koran or any extract from it. Last September, mentally handicapped Shahbaz Masih was sentenced to 25 years imprisonment, convicted of tearing up some leaflets that contained verses from the Koran. In 2003, the same judge sentenced Ranjha Masih (no relation) to life in prison for allegedly throwing a stone at a Muslim signboard with a Koranic verse on it during a bishop's funeral procession. Dozens of other Pakistanis have met similar fates.

In all of these countries, the greatest danger is not from the courts, but from vigilantes and mobs. In Pakistan in 1997, Shantinagar, a Christian town of some 10,000 people, was burned to the ground after a man there was accused of tearing pages from a Koran. In the Netherlands last fall, the documentary producer Theo Van Gogh was butchered after he produced a documentary Submission featuring Koranic verses on women’s bodies.

Even if Newsweek publishes a full retraction, the damage is done. Much of the Muslim world will regard it merely as a cover-up and feel reconfirmed in the view that America is at war with Islam. It will undercut the U.S., including in Afghanistan and Iraq, far more than Abu Ghraib did. “We can understand torturing prisoners, no matter how repulsive” Newsweek quotes one Pakistani saying, “But insulting the Qur’an is like torturing all Muslims.”

It would be charitable to think that if Newsweek had known how explosive the story was it may have held off until it had more confirmation. If this is true, it is an indication that the media’s widespread failure to pay careful attention to the complexities of religion not only misleads us about domestic and international affairs but also gets people killed.

— Paul Marshall is senior fellow at Freedom House's Center for Religious Freedom and editor of the just released Radical Islam's Rules: the Worldwide Spread of Extreme Sharia Law.

by **Eugene Berkovich** on 16 May 2005, 12:05

http://news.independent.co.uk/low_res/s ... t=3&dir=75
Iraq is a bloody no man's land. America has failed to win the war. But has it lost it?
Ten US troops were killed in action across Iraq last week. The fighting is now sustained and ferocious. Patrick Cockburn, winner of the Martha Gellhorn prize for journalism, reports from the frontline of America's war on terror
15 May 2005
Iraq is a bloody no man's land. America has failed to win the war. But has it lost it?

And in Afghanistan, the Taliban rises again for fighting season

"The battlefield is a great place for liars," Stonewall Jackson once said on viewing the aftermath of a battle in the American civil war.

The great general meant that the confusion of battle is such that anybody can claim anything during a war and hope to get away with it. But even by the standards of other conflicts, Iraq has been particularly fertile in lies. Going by the claims of President George Bush, the war should long be over since his infamous "Mission Accomplished" speech on 1 May 2003. In fact most of the 1,600 US dead and 12,000 wounded have become casualties in the following two years.

The ferocious resistance encountered last week by the 1,000-strong US marine task force trying to fight its way into villages around the towns of Qaim and Obeidi in western Iraq shows that the war is far from over. So far nine marines have been killed in the week-long campaign, while another US soldier was killed and four wounded in central Iraq on Friday. Meanwhile, a car bomb targeting a police patrol exploded in central Baghdad yesterday, killing at least five Iraqis and injuring 12.

Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, the leader of one of the Kurdish parties, confidently told a meeting in Brasilia last week that there is war in only three or four out of 18 Iraqi provinces. Back in Baghdad Mr Talabani, an experienced guerrilla leader, has deployed no fewer than 3,000 Kurdish soldiers or peshmerga around his residence in case of attack. One visitor was amused to hear the newly elected President interrupt his own relentlessly upbeat account of government achievements to snap orders to his aides on the correct positioning of troops and heavy weapons around his house.

There is no doubt that the US has failed to win the war. Much of Iraq is a bloody no man's land. The army has not been able to secure the short highway to the airport, though it is the most important road in the country, linking the US civil headquarters in the Green Zone with its military HQ at Camp Victory.

Ironically, the extent of US failure to control Iraq is masked by the fact that it is too dangerous for the foreign media to venture out of central Baghdad. Some have retreated to the supposed safety of the Green Zone. Mr Bush can claim that no news is good news, though in fact the precise opposite is true.

Embedded journalism fosters false optimism. It means reporters are only present where American troops are active, though US forces seldom venture into much of Iraq. Embedded correspondents bravely covered the storming of Fallujah by US marines last November and rightly portrayed it as a US military success. But the outside world remained largely unaware, because no reporters were present with US forces, that at the same moment an insurgent offensive had captured most of Mosul, a city five times larger than Fallujah.

Why has the vastly expensive and heavily equipped US army failed militarily in Iraq? After the crescendo of violence over the past month there should be no doubts that the US has not quashed the insurgents whom for two years American military spokesmen have portrayed as a hunted remnant of Saddam Hussein's regime assisted by foreign fighters.

The failure was in part political. Immediately after the fall of Saddam Hussein polls showed that Iraqis were evenly divided on whether they had been liberated or occupied. Eighteen months later the great majority both of Sunni and Shia said they had been occupied, and they did not like it. Every time I visited a spot where an American soldier had been killed or a US vehicle destroyed there were crowds of young men and children screaming their delight. "I am a poor man but I am going home to cook a chicken to celebrate," said one man as he stood by the spot marked with the blood of an American soldier who had just been shot to death.

Many of the resistance groups are bigoted Sunni Arab fanatics who see Shia as well as US soldiers as infidels whom it is a religious duty to kill. Others are led by officers from Saddam's brutal security forces. But Washington never appreciated the fact that the US occupation was so unpopular that even the most unsavoury groups received popular support.

From the start, there was something dysfunctional about the American armed forces. They could not adapt themselves to Iraq. Their massive firepower meant they won any set-piece battle, but it also meant that they accidentally killed so many Iraqi civilians that they were the recruiting sergeants of the resistance. The army denied counting Iraqi civilian dead, which might be helpful in dealing with American public opinion. But Iraqis knew how many of their people were dying.

The US war machine was over-armed. I once saw a unit trying to restore order at a petrol station where there was a fist fight between Iraqi drivers over queue-jumping (given that people sometimes sleep two nights in their cars waiting to fill a tank, tempers were understandably frayed). In one corner was a massive howitzer, its barrel capable of hurling a shell 30km, which the soldiers had brought along for this minor policing exercise.

The US army was designed to fight a high-technology blitzkrieg, but not much else. It required large quantities of supplies and its supply lines were vulnerable to roadside bombs. Combat engineers, essentially sappers, lamented that they had received absolutely no training in doing this. Even conventional mine detectors did not work. Roadsides in Iraq are full of metal because Iraqi drivers normally dispose of soft drink cans out the window. Sappers were reduced to prodding the soil nervously with titanium rods like wizards' wands. Because of poor intelligence and excessive firepower, American operations all became exercises in collective punishment. At first the US did not realise that all Iraqi men have guns and they considered possession of a weapon a sign of hostile intention towards the occupation. They confiscated as suspicious large quantities of cash in farmers' houses, not realising that Iraqis often keep the family fortune at home in $100 bills ever since Saddam Hussein closed the banks before the Gulf war and, when they reopened, Iraqi dinar deposits were almost worthless.

The US army was also too thin on the ground. It has 145,000 men in Iraq, but reportedly only half of these are combat troops. During the heavily publicised assault on Fallujah the US forces drained the rest of Iraq of its soldiers. "We discovered the US troops had suddenly abandoned the main road between Kirkuk and Baghdad without telling anybody," said one indignant observer. "It promptly fell under the control of the insurgents."

The army acts as a sort of fire brigade, briefly effective in dousing the flames, but always moving on before they are fully extinguished. There are only about 6,000 US soldiers in Nineveh province, of which Mosul is the capital and which has a population of three million. For the election on 30 January, US reserves arriving in Iraq were all sent to Mosul to raise the level to 15,000 to prevent any uprising in the city. They succeeded in doing so but were then promptly withdrawn.

The shortage of US forces has a political explanation. Before the war Donald Rumsfeld, the Secretary of Defence, and his neo-conservative allies derided generals who said an occupation force numbering hundreds of thousands would be necessary to hold Iraq. When they were proved wrong they dealt with failure by denying it had taken place.

There is a sense of bitterness among many US National Guardsmen that they have been shanghaied into fighting in a dangerous war. I was leaving the Green Zone one day when one came up to me and said he noticed that I had a limp and kindly offered to show me a quicker way to the main gate. As we walked along he politely asked the cause of my disability. I explained I had had polio many years ago. He sighed and said he too had had his share of bad luck. Since he looked hale and hearty this surprised me. "Yes," he said bitterly. "My bad luck was that I joined the Washington State National Guard which had not been called up since 1945. Two months later they sent me here where I stand good chance of being killed."

The solution for the White House has been to build up an Iraqi force to take the place of US soldiers. This has been the policy since the autumn of 2003 and it has repeatedly failed. In April 2004, during the first fight for Fallujah, the Iraqi army battalions either mutinied before going to the city or refused to fight against fellow Iraqis once there. In Mosul in November 2004 the 14,000 police force melted away during the insurgent offensive, abandoning 30 police stations and $40m in equipment. Now the US is trying again. By the end of next year an Iraqi army and police force totalling 300,000 should be trained and ready to fight. Already they are much more evident in the streets of Baghdad and other cities.

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