Moderators: Falc, Administration
Afraid you're going to endure American supremacy for the rest of your pathetic life, frog-loser, here, there and everywhere.
Guest: The American GI absolutely proved his worth, as regular US Infantry stopped combined arms German forces.
Just what are you trying to prove, Guest? That the statistics from one battle demonstrate the superiority of the American GI? Good for you.
Anonymous wrote:Leo & Marko...Regarding Eugene's WWII Numbers
I think you both remember how I presented Eugene with numbers at World Crossing regarding American military proficiency in select battles. I particularly honed in on the Battle of the Bulge, showing how the US disproportionately inflicted more casualties than it received...something that generally holds throughout most of WWII...certainly on an aggregate consideration, certainly in the big battles.
He was oblivious to it then and he will be oblivious to it now.
Nevertheless, some of you may want to read this series of US Army reports on the Battle of the Bulge. Pure and simple, the American military contained and reversed a massive German counter-offensive...bending, but not breaking. The American GI absolutely proved his worth, as regular US Infantry stopped combined arms German forces.
The Opposing Troop Strengths
On the morning of 16 December the American forces in the path of the German counteroffensive comprised four and two-thirds divisions with an effective strength of about 83,000 men. The heavy weapons then available numbered 242 Sherman tanks, 182 tank destroyers, and 394 pieces of corps and divisional artillery. These troops and weapons were deployed on a meandering front of 104 miles.
The enemy assault divisions posed to the east had concentrated behind some ninety miles of the front manned by Army Group B, and during the night of 16 December over 200,000 combat troops gathered in the forward assembly area, about three miles in depth. The German attack, as it developed during the course of 16 December, was made on an assault front of sixty miles and included 5 armored divisions, 12 2/3 infantry divisions, and about 500 medium tanks, the whole supported by the fire of 1,900 guns and Werfers.
Although it is impossible to measure the exact number of rifle battalions and tank battalions committed by the Germans during the initial breakthrough attack, it is probable that the over-all ratio of German infantry to American was three to one, with a ratio of six to one at points of concentration. German armored superiority was somewhat less pronounced during the first-day assault, only about two to one in medium tanks. If the self-propelled guns employed in a tank role are considered, the superiority enjoyed by the attacker was about four to one.
By 2 January 1945, the eve of the Allied attack to destroy the Ardennes salient, the Germans had thrown 8 armored divisions, 20 infantry divisions, and 2 mechanized brigades into the Battle of the Bulge. During these eighteen days the Americans had employed 8 armored, 16 infantry, and 2 airborne division in the line. [2] This tabulation of the opposing divisions, however, does not give a true measure of the relative combat strength deployed in what may be called the German phase of the winter battle in the Ardennes.
The American rifle division in 1944 was organized at a strength of 14,032 men, and most of the divisions engaged in this operation entered the fray at full complement. The personnel strength of the German infantry divisions varied, at the time of their commitment, between 8,000 and 17,000, the lower figure representing those divisions which had been refitted at 80 percent of the 1944 Volks Grenadier division table of organization and equipment and the upper figure, which can be applied to only three or four divisions, representing those, like the 26th Volks Grenadier Division, which retained the older, regular infantry division composition. The strength of the German infantry divisions across the board probably averaged little more than 10,000 men. The normal German rifle regiment numbered 1,868 as contrasted with the American infantry regiment of 3,207 officers and men.
The majority of the German panzer divisions had the same manpower configuration as the two U.S. square armored divisions (the 2d and 3d), that is, a little more than 14,000. The six remaining U.S. armored divisions had the new triangular organization with a roster reduced to 10,666 officers and men. The armored weight of the opposing divisions, however, strongly favored the Americans, for the German panzer division brought an average of 90 to 100 medium tanks into the field whereas the American triangular division was equipped with 186 and the two square divisions had 232 medium tanks in their organization tables. Hitler personally attempted to compensate for this disparity by ordering the attachment of separate Army tank battalions of 40 to 50 Panther or Tigers to the regular panzer divisions.
The battle area during the period of 16 December through 3 January has to be measured as a salient in which the relation between the width of the base and the depth of the penetration represents a measure of the adequacy of the forces employed and their operational mobility. The German failure to break through on the north shoulder at Monschau had considerable impact on the width of the planned assault front, and by 18 December the base of the salient had stabilized at a width of fortyseven air-line miles, narrower than desired. The greatest depth of the German penetration, achieved on the tenth day of the attack, was about sixty air-line miles. On that date, however, the average width of the salient had been reduced to thirty miles and at its tip measured no more than a five-mile front facing the Meuse. Indeed, the width of the assault front proper can be considered as the range of the 75-mm. guns of the 2d Panzer tanks. By this time the Americans had something approaching a coordinated and homogenous line as a retaining wall north and south of the salient, with a frontage of nearly seven miles per division on the north flank and a little more than thirteen miles on the southern flank.
I'll weave in and out with more numbers as discerning readers ask questions.
Yes, this precludes the idiot fringe like Eugene and Fifi.
mate wrote:SyntheseJust what are you trying to prove, Guest? That the statistics from one battle demonstrate the superiority of the American GI? Good for you.
I proved what I literally stated what I wanted to prove: namely, that the American GI and Marine proved as proficient as he needed to be in order to efficiently win WWII, given the task at hand and means at his disposal.
Nothing more. Nothing less.
Marko wrote:Thanks, Mate; very interesting site.
I do recall in fact that you posted stats before to rebuke Eugene's claims, but that's an informative site all the same.
mate wrote:Eugene
You are such a lying sack of you know what.
![]()
I absolutely provided numbers that uphold the view of American forces inflicting disproportionate losses upon the Germans and Japanese. I cited as respective examples the Battle of the Bulge and the Battle of Midway. I calculated the casualties received and inflicted as a ratio of # of troops involved...with the Americans coming out ahead.
Read the US Army site I provided. The Germans initially had the numerical advantage in almost every respect in the Battle of the Bulge...sending out 200k men against 80k defenders. Eventually, when reserves were brought in, the the strengths were about 600k Allied and 500k German.
The US suffered anywhere from 60k - 80k casualties, given most sources. The Germans suffered 100 - 120 casualties. Run the math any way you want. I dare you.
![]()
As for the Battle of Midway, do you even want to go there? All 4 Japanese aircraft carriers were sunk as opposed to 1 of 3 American carriers, this being the Yorktown. The Japanese had supeior #'s of warsships, planses, carriers, and men...but American Military Intelligence managed to deliver a cryptic victory, pardon my pun!
![]()
I suggest you do some more reading on WWII from authors like Mansoor. You just might be surprised at what you find.
Leonid wrote:No really, those GIs must have been awful...Normandy, Ardennes, Sicily, Italy, Germany, Midway, Okinawa..you name if...and they suffered only (too many, by the American attitude toward soldier's life) 300,000 losses.
The great Red Army broke that mark near (not counting in) Berlin, despite having enormous advantage in manpower and weaponry. Because supposedly it was a great army, led by military pros?
As simple as that.
Leonid wrote:I'm just smiling at you, useful idiot:)
mate wrote:Eugene
I suggest you digest the following:
PETER R. MANSOOR, currently G-3 for the 4th Infantry Division at Fort Hood, Texas, will soon assume command of one of the Army’s armored brigades. He received his Ph.D. in history from Ohio State University, taught military history at West Point, and was special assistant to the director for strategic plans and policy, The Joint Staff, 1997–1999.
This man is no dummy and is respected for his ideas in military and academic circles. I suggest you actually read his book before you dismiss him off-hand simply because he disagrees with your cherished anti-Americanisms.
mate wrote:Read the following for details, but how come the US military won in a direct assault against German defenders in Maginot Line strong-points...while the Germans were not able to do so against the French?
http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/ww ... tline.aspx
Conclusion
Most of the Maginot Line forts were captured by the U.S. Army with little or no fighting required. For the most part, the Germans chose not to and/or were unable to mount an effective defense of the fortifications. However there were several notable occasions when the Germans had both the means and the will to mount an effective defense. On these occasions, the thick fortifications combined with determined defenders made the capture of the Maginot Line forts a difficult and time-consuming affair for the U.S. Army.
Against the formidable Maginot fortifications and the German defenders, the U.S. Army employed its preponderance of firepower and proficiencies in the use of combined arms: artillery, armor, infantry and engineers. No one American weapon system was able to destroy the Maginot Line forts by itself. Only the M12 self-propelled gun and the M36 tank destroyer using direct fire were able to consistently penetrate and knock-out fortifications. The infantry and engineers captured most of the fortifications but they required firepower support from the other combat arms. U.S. artillery, armor, infantry and engineers were most successful when employed together in a coordinated effort. American commanders quickly realized this and routinely employed their forces in such a manner. As a result, the U.S. Army ultimately accomplished what the German Army had been largely unable to do in 1940: capture Maginot Line forts by assault.
Good will hunting!
Mind you, there are aspects of the above web site you will probably like...and misinterpret.